A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is an engineered physical system with a significant
cybercomponent and consists of many interacting distributed cyber and physical
components. CPSs are deployed in critical applications, such as advanced power electronics in
a green electric power system, vehicles in an automated highway system, distributed aircraft
navigation systems, chemical process plants, and consumer components of a smart house in
which correct operation is paramount. Unintended or misunderstood interactions among the
components of a CPS cause unpredictable behavior, leading to serious errors. While each
component may independently function correctly, their composition may yield incorrectness
due to Interference. Interference that violates correctness or security is well-understood in
the purely software (cyber) domain. In the CPS domain, interference is much less understood.
Security and confidentiality problems are particularly vexing. Attacks such as Stuxnet show
how formal security properties can be violated through physical interference with the cyber
components. To add to the difficulty, CPS security is difficult to specify in terms of traditional
“high” and “low” security.
This talk presents an interpretation of formal information flow properties and interference
within the context of a cyber-physical system, blending both physical and cyber information
flow properties across multiple security domains. This poses the deep scientific question: how
to make such systems secure and correct?

Location:
Clinton, Mississippi